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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
STATE OF UTAH, 
) 
Plaintiff-respondent 
-vs- ) 
Case No. 860299 
MICHAEL LYNN SHELBY, ) 
Defendant-Appellant ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Appellant has requested that counsel raise the 
following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the Trial Court err in signing the 
Judgment which provided for consecutive sentences when the 
defendant was of the understanding that the Court announced 
from the bench that the two sentences would run 
concurrently? 
2. Did the Trial Court err in denying defendant's 
motion for additional time before sentencing within which to 
explore an inpatient drug treatment program as an 
alternative to prison? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
This brief is in the form of an "Anders Brief" as 
designated in the case decided by the Supreme Court of Utah 
in State v. White, 639 P. 2d 168 (Utah 1981). Counsel was 
appointed by the Eleventh Circuit Court in Carbon County to 
represent the defendant in two separate and unrelated 
criminal cases. In Criminal No. 2339 the defendant was 
initially charged with Burglary of a Non-Dwelling, a third 
degree felony, and Theft of a Firearm, a second degree 
felony. As a result of plea negotiation, the defendant 
entered a plea of guilty to the Burglary charge and the 
Theft of Firearm was dismissed. 
In the second case, Criminal No. 2319, the 
defendant was originally charged with two counts of 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value, third 
degree felonies. Through plea negotiations the charges were 
amended to Arranging for Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance for Value, third degree felonies, but carrying 
one-half the prison sentence. The defendant eventually 
entered a plea of guilty to one count and the other was 
dismissed. 
Both cases came on for sentencing on April 17, 
1986. The Court sentenced the defendant to serve a term in 
the Utah State Prison of not to exceed five years in 
Criminal No. 2339 and not to exceed 2 1/2 years in Criminal 
No. 2319, both terms to run consecutively. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Counsel has researched the record and the law and 
is unable to find any case law which would support 
defendant's claim of error. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST CLAIMED ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
SIGNING THE JUDGMENT WHICH PROVIDED FOR CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES. 
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing on 
April 17, 1986, the defendant contended that the Court had 
announced from the bench that the two sentences were to run 
concurrently. Counsel has examined the transcript of the 
hearing at page 25 which clearly states that the two 
sentences are to run consecutively: 
"And those sentences will run consecutively. In 
other words, the one sentence will begin as soon 
as the other one ends. They will not run 
concurrently." (Transcript at P. 25, line 11) 
DEFENDANTS SECOND CLAIMED ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME 
BEFORE SENTENCING WITHIN WHICH TO EXPLORE AN INPATIENT DRUG 
TREATMENT PROGRAM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PRISON. 
Immediately prior to sentencing, the defendant 
requested the Court to grant him a continuance of ten days 
for the purpose of determining whether he would qualify for 
admittance to a residential drug treatment program as an 
alternative to prison. (Transcript at p. 2). The Court 
denied the motion. (Transcript at p. 2). 
The Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Gerrard 584 
P. 2d 885 (Utah 1978), has held that sentencing procedures 
are discretionary with the trial court: 
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"The sentencing procedures, including the use of 
an evaluation, are clearly discretionary with the 
trial court." 584 P.2d at 886. 
The trial Court's refusal in Gerrard to grant a 90 
day evaluation prior to sentencing appears to be analogous 
to the refusal of the trial court in the instant case to 
grant the defendant time to obtain an evaluation as to his 
fitness for a drug treatment program. 
The trial court, of course, is imbued with 
statutory authority to place the defendant on probation: 
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, 
a court may sentence a person adjudged guilty of 
an offense to any one of the following sentences 
or combination of sentences: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualificationn of 
public or private office; 
(c) To probation unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; or 
(e) to death. 
Section 76-3-201 Utah Code Annotated 
However, the use of the word "may" would seem to clothe the 
court with the discretion to order probation, and its 
conditions, when it deemed it appropriate. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has also stated that it 
will not disturb a sentence "...unless it is clearly 
excessive or unless the trial court abused its discretion." 
Gerrard at 887. It does not appear that the Court abused 
its discretion in denying defendant's request for additional 
time in view of the reason stated by the Court for the 
denial: 
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"Well, of course, the application is denied, Mr. 
Bryner. Mr. Shelby's record is such, that when I 
put him on probation for 2319, it was extremely 
marginal whether I thought he was qualified at 
that time. Then to have him come into this Court 
back— for an additional felony and — when he was 
on probation — in other words, the Court doesn't 
feel he's made any significant changes that he 
would have to make in his life. And in view of his 
prior record which shows he's been in prison once 
before, I just don't see any reason why the 
Correction system should spend any more time on 
Mr. Shelby, until he demonstrates he's willing to 
change. (Transcript at p. 2) 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel should be permitted to withdraw as counsel 
in this matter for the reason that he has been unable to 
identify any issues which are arguable on appeal. 
DATED this 25th day of September, 1986. 
( , r . 
Bryce K. Bryner 
294 East 100 Souths 
P.O. Box 4 44 
Price, Utah 84501 
Attorney for Appellant 
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